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NATURE OF CASE
By a petition for Rehearing appellants seek reconsideration of this Court's previous order granting respondents' motion to dismiss this appeal and denying appellants'
motion for an extension of time within which to file their
brief.
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II

I~

PREVIOUS DISPOSITION
On November 7, 1978, this Court entered an

order

granting respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis that
appellants' attorney, Don L. Bybee, had failed to file a
brief on their behalf prior to the October 31, 1978, deadline that had previously been established by this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents, who were plaintiffs below, were
granted judgment against appellants on June 1, 1978, by the
Honorable G. Hal Taylor,

judge of the Third District court

in and for Salt Lake County.

(R. 103-05.)

Thereafter, on

June 16, 1978, appellants' attorney, Don L. Bybee, filed a
notice of appeal dated June 5, 1978, with the District
Court.

(R. 107.)

This Court notified appellants' former counsel,
Mr. Bybee, that his brief was due October 15, 1978.
davit of Don Bybee at

~/

5.)

(Affi-

Due to numerous other matters,

which he apparently deemed more urgent, Mr. Bybee did not
prepare a brief prior to that deadline.
Affidavit of Don Bybee.)

(See generally,

On October 20, 1978, Mr. Bybee

appeared before Justice Maughan and was granted an ex parte
extension giving him through October 31, 1978, in which to
file the brief.

(Id.)

Appellants were not advised by their

counsel either of the expiration of the original deadline
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M

r

,,,I
of the granting of the ex parte extension.
Peter M. Lowe at ,13.)

(Affidavit of

Likewise, appellants were not advised

by their counsel of the pend ency of respondents' motion to
dismiss for the failure of their counsel to file a brief on
their behalf by October 31 or the hearing on that motion on
November 6.

(Id.)

It was only after this Court entered its

November 7, 1978, order dismissing this appeal that appellants
became aware of the true status of their appeal.
NATURE OF RELIEF REQUESTED
By their Petition for Rehearing, appellants request
that this Court reconsider its previous order dismissing
this appeal and modify that order so as to provide that
appellants' appeal will be dismissed only if appellants fail
to reimburse respondents for the costs incurred by them and
to cause a brief to be filed on their behalf within a reasonable time.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION IN THIS CASE MAY

BE RECONSIDERED UPON APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Although the dismissal of this appeal was not an
adjudication upon the merits, such a dismissal nevertheless
has the effect of an affirmance of the trial court's decision:
The dismissal of an appeal is in effect
an affirmance of the judgment or order appealed
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from, unless the dismissal is expressly made
without prejudice to another appeal.
Rule 76(c), U.R.C.P.

Such a dismissal is, therefore, a

"decision" within the meaning of Rule 76(e), which authorizes the Petition for Rehearing procedure.

Accordingly,

even though this Court's dismissal of this appeal was not on
the merits, that dismissal may properly be reconsidered upon
appellants' petition for rehearing.
II.

THE UNCONDITIONAL DISMISSAL OF THIS APPEAL TOO

SEVERELY PENALIZES APPELLANTS FOR CONDUCT OF THEIR ATTORNEY
OF WHICH THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE.
It is not the contention of appellants that the
dismissal of this appeal was beyond the authority of this
Court.

Any such contention would, of course, be entirely

untenable under Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in part that:
Failure of the appellant to take any of
the further steps to secure the review
of the judgment appealed from does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but
is only ground for such remedies as are
specified in this Rule or, when no remedy
is specified, for such action as the
Supreme Court deems appropriate, which
may include dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P.
It is the contention of appellants that the dismissal
of this appeal--the ultimate sanction prescribed by Rule
· 1 circums
·
tances
73--is unduly severe in light of the specia
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of this case.

As reflected by the affidavit of appellant

Peter Lowe and the Statement of Facts above, the appellants
entrusted the prosecution of this appeal to an attorney whom
they believed to be competent and capable.

They relied upon

his discretion, diligence, and responsibility to perfect and
prosecute this appeal in a professional manner.
ance

Such reli-

should not be considered capricious or ill-advised.
The responsibility for the failure to comply with

the deadlines established and the orders rendered by this
Court lies entirely with the appellants' previous attorney.
The preparation of a brief on their behalf was not delayed
because of their personal unwillingness or inability to
provide information or assistance; rather, appellants stood
ready at all times to provide any assistance requested by
their attorney, althouth such assistance was, in fact, never
sought.

(Affidavit of Peter Lowe at

,,4.)

I t is the duty

and responsibility of the attorney, not his client, to
assure the timely preparation of the case.
The courts of this and other jurisdictions have
recognized that when an appeal is dismissed due solely to
the mistakes, inadvertance, or incompetence of a party's
attorney, suitable relief will be granted.

In James v.

Francesco, 61 N.J. 480, 295 A. 2d 633 (1972), the Supreme
Court of New Jersey faced a situation which was factually
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almost identical to that presently before this court.
Following a timely appeal, the appellant's attorney failed
to take the remaining steps necessary to perfect the appeal
and to file a brief on behalf of his client's cause.

Four

months later, the appellate court dismissed the pending
appeal due to the lack of prosecution.

Thereafter, the

appellant retained new counsel, who sought to have the
original appeal reinstated.

In its consideration of the

appellant's motion, the court emphasized that
it is clear to us that the defendant was
egregiously misrepresented by his first
attorney on the appeal. Suffice it to
say that whereas there was a good case
to be made on the appeal the attorney,
although paid an appeal retainer, defaulted
on his obligation to file a brief .
295 A. 2d at 635.

The court, recognizing the inherent

unfairness of denying a party his day in court solely

becau~

his attorney had not fulfilled with dilligence his professional
responsibilities, held:
In such circumstances of probable
merit and serious default of representation
by the first attorney a proper case for
relaxation of the rules is presented in
order to subserve the first objective of
the rules of practice--the accomplishment
of substantial justice on the merits.
295 A. 2d at 365 (emphasis added, numerous citations omitted).
Likewise, this Court, in the interest of substantial justice
on the merits, should exercise its discretion to impose as a
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sanction for the failure of appellants' former attorney to
comply with the reasonable orders of this court, a remedy
which will not deny appellants the opportunity for meaningful review.
The Wyoming Supreme Court applied this concept in
Brown v. Riner, 496 P. 2d 907 (Wyoming 1972), to relieve a
party whose appeal had been dismissed due to the inadvertence of his former counsel.

In that case, the appeal was

originally conducted on behalf of the appellant by an
individual not properly authorized to practice before the
Wyoming Supreme Court.

That court emphasized that the

appellant had, upon discovering that his former counsel had
not been authorized to represent him, promptly obtained
authorized counsel.

Noting that, as to the party personally,

"the violation of the rule in this instance appears to have
been unintentional,

[and) with full compliance now assured"

the appeal was reinstated.

496 P. 2d at 908.

As in this case, the personal problems and professional situation of a sole practitioner lead to the
dismissal of his client's appeal for failure to prosecute in
Lundy v. Lakin, 202 P. 2d 369 (Cal. App. 1949).

In that

case, appellant entrusted his appeal to a sole practitioner,
who, for a variety of reasons, was unable complete and file
a brief on behalf of his client.

The court emphasized that,
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as in this case, the "asserted lack of dilligence . . . is
wholly attributable to the one attorney who represented
appellants under adverse circumstances .

.

.

In holding

that the appellant's appeal should be reinstated, the court
noted the desirabiltiy of hearing all appeals on the merib:
It is true that the court rules
requiring prompt action on the part of
appellants to perfect and prosecute their
appeals with diligence should be strictly
complied with in every respect.
It is
the purpose of the law to expedite appeals
in the interest of justice and to discourage
dillatory proceedings. But it has been
frequently said by our courts that it is
also the policy of the law to hear all
appeals on their merits, if it is reasonably possible to do so.
202 P. 2d at 371 (emphasis added, numerous citations omitted).
Accordingly, the interests of justice require that, upon
reimbursing respondents for costs incurred as a result of
the failures of their former attorney, these appellants be
given an opportunity to present to this Court their arguments on the merits of their appeal.
In Moore v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 408, 526 P. 2d
893

(1974), an appeal was dismissed due to technical insuf-

ficiencies and errors in which the appellant had not personally
participated.

Again emphasizing that the appellant was not

personally at fault, the Washington Supreme Court held that
the appeal should be reinstated, noting:
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Since the deprivation order was entered,
[the.appellant) has diligently sought to
obtain.appellate review of the proceeding,
but owing to occurrences beyond her control,
she has been denied any review on the
merits.
526 P. 2d at 896.

Upon learning of the failure of their

counsel to comply with the orders of this Court, appellants
have likewise obtained new counsel and seek now to pursue
their appeal in full compliance with the rules and orders of
this Court.
Similarly, in Washington v. Evans, 338 P. 2d 754
(Washington 1959) , the dismissal of an appeal was vacated on
the basis that the appeal had originally been dismissed only
through the inadvertance of the appellant's former counsel.
This Court, also, has recognized that the dismissal
of an appeal may be vacated and the appeal reinstated when
it appears that the dismissal resulted from circumstances
which were beyond the personal control of the appellant.
For example, in Penman v. Eimco Corporation, 114 Utah 16,
196 P. 2d 984

(1948), this court upheld the reinstatement of

an appeal to district court that had been dismissed for the
appellant's failure timely to pay the required filing fee.
After the dismissal, the appellant demonstrated that although
tendered to the Clerk of the district court, the fees had
been rejected since the papers in the case had not yet been
transferred from city court.

In the present case, as in
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Penman, the dismissal of the appeal should be vacated since
·
the appellants did not personally participate in the ad mitted
·
i·
failure of their former counsel to comply with this Court's
appeal procedure.

Moreover, as this Court recognized in

Harris v. Tilley, 25 Utah 2d 260, 480 P. 2d 142 (1971),
the alleged incompetence or inadvertance of a party's
counsel is a matter appropriately to be considered if such
can be shown to have played a significant role in the previous
disposition of the case.
CONCLUSION
By their petition for rehearing, appellants do not
contend that this Court exceeded its authority in dismissing
their appeal.

Appellants do contend, however, that the

dismissal of their appeal, for the failure of their former
counsel timely to file a brief on their behalf, too severe~
penalizes them for the conduct of their former counsel of
which they had no knowledge and to which they neither contributed nor participated.
Appellants request that this Court reconsider its
prior decision dismissing their appeal and exercise its
discretion to modify that order of dismissal.

By requiring

appellants to reimburse respondents for the costs incurred
by them as a result of the failure of appellants' former
attorney to diligently prosecute this appeal, any prejudice
to the opposing parties can be avoided.
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In view of the overriding policy favoring the
review of all appeals on the merits, courts of this and
other jurisdictions have traditionally reinstated those
appeals dismissed due to the errors, inadvertence, or
incompetence of a party's counsel.

By the original dismissal

of this appeal, this Court has demonstrated that failure to
accomplish timely compliance with its rules and orders will
not be condoned; by now reinstating this appeal, this Court
can avoid imposing an unduly harsh sanction upon appellants
on account of improprieties in which they did not participate
and of which they had no knowledge.
RESEPCTFULLY SUBMITTED this

27

day of November,

1978.
DART & STEGALL

By

B. L. DART
B. L. Dart

By
John D. Parken
Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing to Carman E. Kipp,
600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111,

attorney for respondents, on this ___ day of November, 1978,
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